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Abstract—Business requirements for rapid operational 
efficiency, customer responsiveness as well as rapid 
adaptability are actively driving the need for ever 
increasing communication and integration capabilities of 
software assets. In this context, security, although 
acknowledged as being a necessity, is often perceived as a 
hindrance. Indeed, dynamic environments require flexible 
and understandable security that can be customized, 
adapted and reconfigured dynamically to face changing 
requirements. In this paper, the authors propose SOA-
based security governance middleware that handles 
security requirements on behalf of a resource exposed 
through it. The middleware aims at providing different 
security settings through the use of managed compositions 
of security services called profiles. The main added value 
of this work compared to existing handlers or centralized 
approaches lies in its enhanced flexibility and 
transparency. 
Keywords-SOA, SOA governance, SOA security, SOA 
adaptability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The way enterprises conduct their business is 
constantly changing and the need for adaptation and 
seizure of emerging opportunities is often strong. 
Enterprises have become more pervasive, with mobile 
workforces, outsourced data centers, different 
engagements with customers, suppliers and distributed 
sites [1]. This increases the need for securing end-to-
end transactions between business partners and 
customers. Yet, as presented in [2], fully or correctly 
incorporating security is often seen as an impediment 
to the process of writing and deploying software. 
In order to achieve agility and shorter concept-to-
market timescales for new products and services, ICT 
service providers and their corporate customers alike 
increasingly adopt a collection of technologies, 
concepts and capabilities which come under the banner 
of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The Security 
as a Service (SaaS) paradigm can be a means of 
providing security-related functionalities in a SOA 
context. 
The aim of this paper is to show how a governed 
composition of security-related services (e.g. access 
control, identity management), provided through the 
SaaS paradigm, can be leveraged upon in order to 
provide a flexible and auditable approach to security in 
distributed and complex systems. This paper features 
security governance middleware that allows 
manipulating the security configuration of exposed 
resources in a more dynamic and flexible way 
compared to existing techniques such as handlers [3] or 
the Security Service Bus [4]. An additional key aspect 
of this security governance middleware is to improve 
the visibility of various parameters taken into account 
when securing access to resources in order to facilitate 
the decision making process. Throughout this paper, 
the authors attempt to demonstrate the practicability of 
governed, composable and adaptable security. 
In section II related work is outlined and its 
drawbacks discussed in the presented context. In 
section III the SOA governance architecture developed 
by the authors is introduced. In section IV a specific 
use case of this architecture, dedicated to managing 
security is presented through a virtual music store 
scenario. Finally an evaluation of this security-oriented 
use case is made and supplemented by conclusions. 
The paper should be considered a more detailed 
version of [5], where the authors briefly outline their 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In the security area, projects like GOLD [6] and 
TrustCoM [7] have demonstrated the feasibility of 
policy-based security solutions in decentralized 
environments. These solutions, however, present only 
limited capacity to adapt to changes in policy (e.g. 
grammar) or its enforcement processes (e.g. when a 
threat is discovered). 
In [8] and [4] flexible security policy enforcement 
architectures are proposed. However, they do not 
provide the same level of dynamicity and evolution, as 
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they require more human involvement (e.g. 
administrator, developer) in order to add new security 
services or take new security contracts into account.  
III. ANATOMY OF GOVERNANCE MIDDLEWARE 
The goal of this governance middleware is to 
manage the exposure of a resource over a network. In 
the context of this paper, such a client resource is 
called Business Capability. This capability is achieved 
by managing properties of the exposure, including its 
non-functional properties (NFPs) (e.g. audit, transport 
protocol) as well as the lifecycle of the infrastructure 
put in place to govern the exposure and the services 
enacting NFPs. 
For the presented governance to be effective, each 
of these Infrastructure Capabilities (i.e. a service that 
enacts an NFP) is expected to be deployed as a web 
service with its own service management, policy 
administration framework (control pane) and 
operational interfaces (data pane). Each capability is 
also expected to be policy-driven as this permits 
configurability and flexibility. Different capabilities are 
each meant to have their own distinct grammar and 
policy languages in order to maintain their own 
advantages, capacities and evolution potential in their 
respective domains. This approach enables the 
interchange of core capabilities within respective 
categories, according to the NFP requirements 
(whenever necessary). 
In order to achieve this, the NFP requirements of 
the exposed resource are expressed in a normalized 
manner as a profile which is used to define the way the 
resource is to be exposed. 
The architecture is divided into three distinct 
dimensions: operational, data and management. The 
operational dimension defines a set of core elements 
forming the execution of the governance middleware 
itself (e.g. access control, identity brokerage, service 
registry). The data layer allows describing various 
aspects of governance. Finally, the management layer 
supports the interactions between different elements of 
the infrastructure.  
This governance middleware provides a 
management interface as an entry point for both 
selecting the profile type (if one has been defined) and 
specifying the context in which a profile type will 
operate. 
More details on this architecture can be found in [9, 
10]. In the following sections, an implementation of 
this framework dedicated to governing the security 
aspects of web services exposure and interactions is 
presented. 
IV. VIRTUAL MUSIC STORE SCENARIO 
A. Description 
This section describes the scenario of a Virtual 
Music Store (VMS) as an example of a Virtualized 
Organization (VO). VOs can be loosely defined as 
temporal collaborations between organizational entities 
[11]. According to [12], VOs are frequently 
restructured, sustained to capture the value of a market 
opportunity and dissolved again to pave the way for a 
new VO created from within a network of independent 
partners. As such, VOs represent an opportunity for 
adaptability that current systems, such as the GOLD 
middleware [6] or the TrustCOM B2B gateway [7, 13] 
also attempt to address.  
The presented security governance middleware 
intercepts messages addressed to a VMS, enforces 
security policies and integrates the defined security 
capabilities (e.g. identity management, authorization 
service) in order to secure VMS communications with 
its suppliers. 
With this scenario, the authors aim to demonstrate 
that the architecture introduced in section 3 can be 
applied to provide complex NFPs such as access 
control, identity management and policy enforcement. 
Indeed, these security-related NFPs necessitate 
configuration of the capabilities both individually and 
collectively. For instance, in a certain federation 
anatomy, a Secure Token Service (STS) providing 
identity management will not only have to be 
configured, but will also require a means for 
establishing trust with the different STSs it is meant to 
interact with. The situation can be different in other 
federation anatomies, thus necessitating tight 
management of how to govern the assembly of 
capabilities in a safe manner. 
B. Partners and roles 
In this scenario, the aggregated services are virtual 
music stores serving specialized markets or 
communities of interest. The basic service providers 
include copyright owners of musical recordings or their 
representatives who make such recordings available 
online. The music stores reach agreements with music 
providers enabling them to act as re-sellers of bundles 
of recordings from their respective catalogues. The 
VMS is a VO consisting of the music store operator 
communicating with content providers through security 
governance middleware whose security services are 
provided by external security providers using the SaaS 
paradigm. 
The end customer of the VMS will be a member of 
the public. What they will see is a web site where they 
are able to search for and buy tracks, and access music-
related content (e.g. reviews, blogs). This content could 
be presented to them in much the same way as 
538
AbeBooks does, i.e. a search page, with each returned 
item linked in by an independent seller. Alternatively, 
stores could hide the aggregated nature of the service. 
As shown in Figure 1, in the music store scenario, 
the main partner categories are: 
 
Figure 1. Virtual music store scenario with security governance 
middleware 
Content Provider (CP): this is a specialized 
content provider (e.g. record labels or other copyright 
owners). Three different content providers take part in 
this particular scenario. Each uses a different security 
profile which it shares in a secure way with the VMS 
operator through the security governance middleware. 
The security profiles express formalized security 
requirements in a set of XML files, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. The following is a list of content providers, 
with an overview of their security settings: 
• CP1 requires HTTP basic access authentication. 
• CP2 requires SecPAL to express its access control 
requests and identify the requesters. 
• CP3 requires login and password with its custom 
XML token schema. 
Security governance provider: this role involves 
providing the VMS with security governance 
middleware. The purpose of such middleware is to hide 
the technical complexity of the security system 
involved and enhance the visibility of security actions 
that need to be enforced. In addition, it allows 
connecting the VMS to different content providers that 
expose their catalogs using diverse security 
configurations. 
Virtual Music Store (VMS) operator: this is the 
music broker. Ultimately, the administrator of the VMS 
is responsible for selecting its CP partners. 
Security a a Service (SaaS) provider: this is a 
third party entrusted with providing a security service 
such as identity management, access control or audit. 
These services are managed by security governance 
and allow the content providers and music store 
operator to leverage the security governance middlware 
to enhance their interoperability while preserving the 
necessary level of security. In this experiment, the 
services shown in Figure 4 are registered and described 
using the same taxonomy as the one used in the 
security profile. Although these providers are not 
known from the VMS and CPs, for the sake of this 
experiment it is assumed that actors trust the security 
governance provider who, in turn, trusts the security 
service providers. The authors believe that in a 
production environment this issue would be overcome 
by providing solutions such as QoS or dynamic trust-
based selection of services. 
C. Security governance lifecycle 
This section describes the lifecycle of the virtual 
music store security. It starts with the governance 
middlware configuration, then carries on with initial 
agreements and discovery of potential partners, leading 
to the formation of a new VO. This is followed by 
security profile management, facilitating verification 
and instantiation of the security profile supplied by 
content providers. Finally, the adaptability faculty of 
the virtual store infrastructure is introduced. 
Security governance middleware configuration. 
Prior to forming the VO and at any time during the 
following steps, the security governance middleware is 
meant to reach agreements with security service 
providers to use their services within a particular 
context (e.g. VO) and/or with specific requirements 
(e.g. security settings) in order to provide security for 
the different content providers used by the VMS. In a 
production environment, these agreements could be 
reached using human or electronic negotiation 
protocols.  
VO formation. Prior to any collaborative task and 
once the virtual shop has decided to establish the music 
store, it needs to reach an agreement with the security 
governance provider. 
With a governance middleware in place, the VMS 
operator contacts the potential participants of the music 
shop (i.e. CPs). Agreements are reached between these 
content providers and the VMS operator regarding the 
conditions in which the business will be conducted and 
the VO will operate. Subsequently, the CPs deposit 
their security profiles in the middleware together with 
the relevant data about their business functions (e.g. 
music catalog). These security profiles contain the data 
necessary for the governance middleware to understand 
how to securely connect to CP services. More 
specifically, this means that CP3’s security profile will 
comport a reference to the appropriate login XML 
schema. CP2’s security profile, on the other hand, will 
provide (for instance) a reference to the SecPAL 
assertion it expects along which information on which 
service, interface and operation the security governance 
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middleware needs to contact in order to establish trust 
and therefore allow for its identity to be established. 
Security profile management. At this stage it 
becomes possible for the security middleware to create 
the different security profiles.  
To achieve this, the profile management component 
of the middleware goes through a set of actions that 
starts with the verification of the security profile 
proposed, then defines the processes necessary for the 
instantiation and management of the future 
implementation of the security profile. 
Profile management is divided into two main 
logical domains: profile consistency management and 
profile lifecycle management. Each of these domains 
can be further split into several steps: defining the 
infrastructure capabilities, policy templates, service 
dependencies and information flow (for consistency 
management) and defining the profile management 
process and publishing the infrastructure profile (for 
lifecycle management). The following steps detail the 
security profile management lifecycle. 
1. Define service description; 
2. Define service policy scheme; 
3. Define service usage policy; 
4. Define service management process. 
The first stage of this process is to check, for each 
security service, whether the description given in the 
security profile is adequate and complete according to 
the profile description taxonomy. If that test passes, the 
abstract definition of the service as well as its 
requirements are gathered. At this stage the governance 
has not selected a particular instance of any running 
service but has selected the appropriate categories in 
the domain description taxonomy. 
The security governance middleware separates 
copies of the security profile at the beginning and end 
of this process. 
5. Select service; 
6. Define policy template; 
7. Define domain of metadata transformations (I/O 
metadata); 
8. Define policy management processes. 
This second stage verifies if the policy type that 
will be used requires any translation (when using 
different grammar types). In addition, this stage checks 
how they need to be managed. 
9. Select security service; 
10. Define operation bindings; 
11. Define security service invocation pattern; 
12. Validate security service dependencies. 
Following this individual check, the relationships 
between the services, both on the managerial and 
operational sides, are verified. 
The last stage involves going through the security 
profile and checking for missing components. For 
instance, a content provider could have specified an 
access control method without mentioning any identity 
management. 
Following this, the VMS operator can review and 
select the best matches from among the positive 
answers it has received, potentially eliminating content 
providers with weak or costly security configurations. 
13. Select security services; 
14. Define policy metadata transformations; 
15. Validate policy dependencies. 
With the security profile complete and safe, the fourth 
stage aims at checking how the data will flow from one 
operation to the next and determining, whenever 
relevant, whether a translation process is necessary 
amongst them and/or with the content provider’s 
security settings. Please note that for simplicity’s sake 
this experiment does not focus on or implement the 
translation itself. 
The result of this step is saved as a security profile that 
can be instantiated. 
16. Select security service management processes; 
17. Select policy management processes; 
18. Define coordination process; 
19. Bind management processes with coordination process; 
20. Validate dependencies. 
With the profile in place and the services selected, the 
final stage consists in the profile management 
component defining the different steps that will be 
necessary in order to call, configure and connect the 
security services. 
The result of this last stage is stored together with the 
now-complete safe security profile as a profile 
management process. 
When necessary, the security governance middleware 
can enact this complete profile through its management 
process and, upon the completion of this enactment, 
begin exchanging messages with each content provider. 
Moving from a security profile (as provided by steps 1-
20) to its enacted version involves the following: 
21. Discover infrastructure profiles (exposure of context); 
22. Select infrastructure profile(s); 
23. Define bindings to business capability; 
24. Validate service dependencies. 
When required to enact a security profile, the 
middleware searches its database for a suitable match. 
It then makes sure that data can flow between the 
enacted security profile and the VMS connections to 
the secured CP services. 
25. Select infrastructure capability; 
26. Refine policy template-specific policies; 
27. Update capability policies. 
Profile management iterates through all the specific 
services selected in the security profile and instantiates 
policy templates by inserting the context data. 
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28. Select infrastructure capabilities; 
29. Refine policy metadata transformations (service-specific 
metadata); 
30. Validate policy dependencies. 
If necessary, the transformations templates are also 
instantiated according to the results of step 14. 
31. Select profile management processes; 
32. Select business capability management processes; 
33. Define coordination process; 
34. Bind management processes with coordination process; 
35. Validate dependencies. 
The profile manager orders and binds the different 
management processes of the security profile and the 
VMS connections to the CP services they protect. 
36. Update capability policy stores; 
37. Update infrastructure bindings; 
38. Expose business capability to service endpoint; 
39. Publish service. 
Finally, the policies created in step 26 are pushed to the 
relevant stores (e.g. the SaaS capabilities driven by 
them) through the enactment of management processes. 
Finally, the VMS clients of the CP services are bound 
to their instantiated profiles and exposed. 
Adaptability. A VMS will want to be able to 
include as many content providers as it can, but 
different partners will have distinct security needs and 
settings. By reviewing and accepting the different 
security profiles used by each partner according to its 
specific needs, the VMS can more promptly make use 
of their contents. This both necessitates and is limited 
by the capability of the security governance 
middleware to find security-related services that 
provide for these different requirements. 
V. EVALUATION 
The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate the 
adaptability of security governance middleware. In 
order to do so, the authors have assessed its capacity 
for integration with different systems and the capacity 
to manage this adaptability when dealing with different 
types of unavailability. Communications between the 
VMS and the security governance solution are secured 
using the VMS security settings. The security of this 
type of middleware is assumed to be equivalent to that 
of the security profiles it enacts. Indeed, the message 
exchanges between the different components of the 
middleware are secured as well as the exchanges with 
external services. External security services that are 
used to provide security requirements are trusted.  
In [4] (cf. related work section), the authors have 
devised six types of adaptation that a flexible security 
middleware suite should support: 
S1 Change a local parameter of a security 
component (e.g. the encryption method for an audit 
service). 
S2 Introduce new security functionality (e.g. add a 
secure logging component). 
S3 Compose/recompose a deployed security 
component with one or more application components. 
Application components depend on the security 
component but the security component can also depend 
on the application component(s) (e.g. for context-based 
access control). 
S4 Swap a security component for another one (e.g. 
replace the authorization decision engine). 
S5 Compose a security component using a (new) 
third-party component that is deployed elsewhere. 
S6 Change a security policy. Since the security 
policy explicitly depends on application-level concepts, 
any change in a security policy can require further 
adaptations. 
The system proposed in this paper, based on the 
security profile, is meant to introduce flexibility to the 
way in which the NFP aggregation lifecycle is managed 
and user requirements expressed. Therefore the 
following evaluation points have been added: 
S7 Enact the security profile at different stages in 
different situations (e.g. CP1 steps 1-39, CP2 steps 21-
39). 
S8 Express identical requirements using different 
semantics. 
A. Qualitative evaluation 
The objective of this type of evaluation is to ensure 
that the adaptability functions as intended and to define 
its limits. The security profiles submitted by the content 
provider to the security governance middleware have 
been used in order to determine the scope of the 
adaptation. 
S1 Changing a security service’s configuration 
requires the user to change the security profile. With 
the change committed, the governance middleware will 
make use of Service Management’s access to the 
security service’s management interface to perform the 
change. However, the governance infrastructure will go 
through the process of profile management to ensure 
that the change is valid and can be realized. If the 
security service does not support this change a different 
one may be selected or the modification rejected. 
S2 If the relevant security services are registered as 
accessible in this context and with these requirements, 
a security profile needs to be updated with the 
additional security functionality. 
S3 Composition of security as well as other value-
adding services can be realized. Of course, the quality 
of the segregation of a security service between 
different contexts (e.g. different interactions and 
conversations) depends on its implementation and may 
not be possible. For instance, a service may or may not 
support multi-domain instantiations and configurations. 
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S4 As previously presented, replacing a security 
service with another, similar one is achievable as long 
as a potential replacement is registered and accessible. 
If a security service is found missing at runtime, it is 
possible to start again from step 13 onwards, to 
regenerate an instantiated profile while storing the 
incoming and outgoing messages. 
S5 The ability to compose external providers’ 
security services is the very foundation of this work. 
S6 In this model, this is equivalent to S1. The 
potential transformation required to interact with other 
security services will also be adapted. 
S7 It is possible to store a profile’s state at any 
stage of its lifecycle. However, validation stages are 
required in most cases to ensure the profile’s validity at 
the time of use (e.g. whether the security service is still 
available). 
S8 This point has not been verified in this set of 
experiments. However, it is defined in [9] and depends 
on the different semantic styles used as well as their 
interoperability. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the authors provide an overview of an 
architecture for SOA governance along with a scenario 
instance dedicated to managing the security aspects of 
message exchanges between distributed resources. This 
instance has been evaluated against a virtual music 
store scenario where it is necessary to adapt to three 
different security settings. An evaluation of how the 
security governance middleware provides adaptable 
security in regards to this scenario is proposed. 
It is noticeable that the increased complexity of the 
governance middleware, compared to the more 
traditional and static approach of handlers, implies an 
additional level of complexity. However, we believe 
this tradeoff is compensated for by the gains in 
flexibility and dynamicity, as well as by supporting per-
action result audits (if necessary). 
Future work will focus on investigating the 
possibility for the governance infrastructure to behave 
in a more autonomous manner to achieve self-* systems 
(self-adaptive, self-healing, self-growing etc.) For 
instance, when no similar service can be discovered, 
the content provider and the VMS could be advised to 
modify their security settings. The security governance 
middleware could then attempt to automatically find a 
relevant compromise, while waiting for the situation to 
be resolved.  
Resource permitting, another direction for future 
work is the analysis of the architecture’s scalability in a 
more complex scenario. 
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